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TherewaslittleroomforMaxWeber'sideathatadriveforsocialstatusmight dominateeconomicmotives.MaterialistapproachestohistorybothbyMarxistand bybusiness-orientedwritersassumedthateconomicfactorsdeterminedstatusand political power, not the other way around. The basic context for enterprise was deemedtoconsistoftimelessconstants:money,account-keepingtocalculategains, credit,andbasiccontractualformalities.Totheextentthatpublicinstitutionswere recognizedaseconomicactors,theywereassumedtobeanoverhead,incurredatthe expenseofenterprise,notasmeansofpromotingit.Therewaslittleideaoftemples andpalacesplayingacatalyticrole,muchlessakeyoneinproductionorproviding moneyandprovisioningcommercialventures.Therewasevenlessthoughtofrulers regulatingmarkets,cancelingpersonaldebts,andreversinglandtransfersasaway toenhanceprosperity.
Translationofcuneiformrecordsoverthepastcenturyhaschangedtheseattitudes. AveritableexplosionofcolloquiaoverthepastdecadehasanalyzedtheemergenceofenterpriseinMesopotamiaanditsneighbors(inparticularDercksen1999; Bongenaar2000; Zaccagnini2003; ManningandMorris2005; and,earlier,Archi 1984 ,inadditiontothecompendiousCivilizations of the Ancient Near East [Sasson et al. 1995] ). Our own working group, the International Scholars Conference on AncientNearEasternEconomies,hasheldcolloquiadealingwiththepublic/private balance(HudsonandLevine1996),theemergenceofurbanandrurallandmarkets (HudsonandLevine1999),debtpracticesandhowsocietieshandledtheeconomic strainstheycaused(HudsonandVanDeMieroop2002),account-keepingandthe emergence of standardized prices and money (Hudson and Wunsch 2004) . These conference volumes have been bolstered by many books and articles presenting a complexviewoftheemergenceofcommercialenterprise. ThevastsupplyofNearEasterntabletsandinscriptionsdealingwitheconomic affairsisbeingtranslatedfreeofthepastgeneration'sideologicalsplitoverwhether the economic organization of classical Greece was "ancient," "primitivist," and "anthropological"incharacter,asassertedbyKarlBücher,KarlPolanyi,andMoses Finley,or"modern,"asassertedbyEduardMeyerandMikhailRostovtzeff.(The basicdocumentsinthecentury-olddebatearecollectedinFinley1979.Forarecent discussionseeManningandMorris2005.)Halfacenturyago,PolanyiandFinley criticized"modernist"viewsofantiquitybyclaimingthatitoperatedaspartofa systemmore"traditional"andbureaucraticthanentrepreneurial.Thequasi-Marxist theoryofOrientaldespotismwasevenmoreextreme.Butthepastfewdecadesof scholarshiphaveseenthependulumswingbackawayfromsuchviews,findingmany innovativeeconomicpracticesintheancientworld(Hudson2005-6).
Itisnowrecognizedthatmostofthetechniquesthatwouldbecomebasiccommercialpracticesinclassicalantiquitywerealreadydevelopedinthethirdmillennium BC in the temples and palaces of the Bronze Age Near East-money, along with the uniform weights, measures, and prices needed for account-keeping and annual reports (Hudson and Wunsch 2004) , the charging of interest (Van De Mieroop 2005; Hudson and Van De Mieroop 2002) , and profit-sharing arrangementsbetweenpublicinstitutionsandprivatemerchantsrangingfromlong-distance tradetoleasingland,workshops,andretailbeer-sellingconcessions (Renger1984, 1994 (Renger1984, ,2002 .Assyriologistsnowapplythetermentrepreneur broadlytoAssyrian and Babylonian tamkarum "merchants" from early in the second millennium BC downtotheEgibiandMurashufamiliesofBabyloniainthesevenththroughfifth centuriesBC,whocreatednovelcommercialstrategiestomanageestatesandprovisionthepalaceanditsarmedforces.
Thesepracticesinitiallyweredevelopedtocreateanexportsurplusoftextiles, metalwork,andotherlabor-intensiveproductstoobtainthestone,metal,andother raw materials lacking in southern Mesopotamia (what is now Iraq). During the second millennium these techniques diffused westward via Ugarit and Crete to MycenaeanGreece.AfterthelongDarkAgethatfollowedthecollapseofMycenae circa1200BC,seafaringmerchantsbroughtthemtoGreeceandItaly,wherethey wereadoptedcirca750BCinacontextlessconducivetoenterpriseandwithfewer institutional checks and balances on debt, dependency, and economic polarization.Clientagecametobeviewedasanaturalstateofaffairsaseconomicattitudes changedfromthoseintheNearEast.
Wealthy Greek and Roman families controlled handicraft production, trade, andcreditdirectlyratherthancoordinatingtheseactivitiesviathetemplesandpalaces.Yetclassicalantiquity'saristocraticattitudeviewedcommercialenterpriseas demeaningandcorrupting.Thedetailsoftradeandenterprisetypicallywereleftto outsidersortoslavesandothersubordinatesactingason-the-spotmanagers,organizers,andmiddlemenfortheirbackers.Mostenterprisingindividualsweredrawn fromthebottomranksofthesocialscale,typifiedbythefictionalbutparadigmatic freedmanTrimalchioinPetronius'scomedydatingfromthetimeofAugustus."The greateraman 'sdignitas,"D'Arms(1981,45) haspointedout,"themorelikelythat hisinvolvement [inbusiness] wasindirectanddiscreet,camouflagedbehindthatof anundistinguishedfreedman,-client,partner,'frontman,'or'friend,'"andleaving managementoftheiraffairstoslavesorothersubordinates. Whensuchlesserindividualswereabletoaccumulatefortunesoftheirown,theyaspiredtohighstatus andprestigebysinkingtheirmoneyintolandandobtainingpublicoffice.ThefreedmanTrimalchio"immediatelyceasedtotradeafteramassingafortune, [and] invests inlandandhenceforthtalksandactslikeacaricatureofaRomansenator" (D'Arms 1981,15; seeDioChrysostom,Or.46.5) .
AlthoughwemightexpectRomansatthehighendoftheeconomicspectrumto haveenormouspersonalfortunescorrespondingtothecity-state'sgreatriches(parasiticasthesemayhavebeen), Heichelheim(1958-70,3:125) notesthatitsleading familiesspentbeyondtheirmeans,runningupcatastrophicdebtsintheirdrivefor statusandpower.Thisbehavior"findsnoanalogyatthetimeoftheGoldenAgeof Greeceeitheramongprivateindividualsoramongprinces."
Thehistoryofenterpriseinantiquitythereforefallsnaturallyintotwoperiods. First is the development of economic practices in Mesopotamia circa 3500-1200 BC. By the end of antiquity we find gain-seeking shifting away from productive enterprisetolandacquisition,usury,profiteeringfrompoliticaloffice,andextractionofforeigntributebyforce.Tobeginthestoryofenterpriseinthislaterclassical epochthuswouldbetoignorethefactthatmostcommercialpracticesalreadyhad apedigreeofthousandsofyearsbythetimeNearEasterntradersbroughtthemto theMediterraneanlandsinthemid-eighthcenturyBC.
What led communities to develop a commercial ethic in the first place? Who werethebeneficiaries,andhowwerethebenefitsshared?Whydidthisethic,which seemssonaturaltoustoday,takesolongtoemergeintheancientworld,onlyto beoverwhelmedbylesseconomicallyproductive,morecorrosivesocialvalues?To answerthesequestionsitisnecessarytoaddressthetransitionfrominterpersonal giftexchangetobulktradeatstandardizedmarketprices,thatis,from"anthropological"to"economic"exchangeandproduction.
The Revolutionary Entrepreneurial Gain-Seeking Ethic
TradeextendsbackdeepintothePaleolithic,butmoderntribalexperienceandlogic suggestthatthemostarchaictradeprobablyoccurredviareciprocalgiftexchange, whoseprimaryaimwastopromotecohesionamongthecommunity'smembers,and peacefulrelationsamongchiefsofneighboringtribes. (Mauss'sThe Gift [1925] is theparadigmaticstudyalongtheselines.)Anthropologicalstudieshavedocumented that the typical attitude in low-surplus communities living near subsistence levels isthatself-seekingtendstoachievegainsattheexpenseofothers.Traditionalsocialvaluesthereforeimposesanctionsagainsttheaccumulationofpersonalwealth. Theeconomicsurplusissosmallthatmakingaprofitorextractinginterestwould pushfamiliesintodependencyonpatronsorbondagetocreditors.Thebasicaimof survivalrequiresthatcommunitiessavetheircitizenryfromfallingbelowthebreakevenlevelmorethantemporarily.Inantiquity,forexample,losinglandrightsmeant losingone'sstatusasacitizen,andhenceone'smilitarystanding,leavingthecommunitypronetoconquestbyoutsiders.
The result is that while low-surplus economies usually do produce surpluses, archaic political correctness dictated that they should be consumed, typically by publicdisplayandgiftexchange,provisioningfeastsatmajorritesofpassage(entry intoadulthood,marriage,orfunerals),orburialwiththedead.Statusundersuch conditionsisgainedbygivingawayone'swealth,nothoardingorreinvestingit.It longremainedmostculturallyacceptabletoconsumeeconomicsurplusesinpublic festivals,dedicatethemtoancestors,and,intime,tosupplyprovisionsfortheconstructionoftemplesandothermonumentalstructures.
Concentration of the Economic Surplus at the Top of the Social Pyramid
When tribal communities mobilize surpluses (usually as much via warfare as by trade), they tend to be concentrated in the chief's household, to be used, at least ostensibly,onbehalfofthecommunityatlarge.Andaspartoftheirroleasthecommunity's"face"initscommercialormilitaryrelationswithoutsiders,this"household"tendstoabsorbrunaways,exiles,orotherunattachedindividuals.Theethic ofmutualaidcallsforchiefs,inturn,toactinanopen-handedway.
Somesurplusnormallyisneededforspecializednonagriculturalproduction. Insuchcaseseitherthechieforleadingfamiliesmayadministerasanctified,corporatelydistinctcultchargedwithcapital-intensiveproductionsuchasmetalsmithing. Suchoccupationsofteninvolveaparticularclassofworkers,whoneedtobesuppliedwithrawmaterials,andeitherwiththeirownself-supportlandorwithfood fromthechief'shouseholdorfromlandleasedoutbythespecializedgroup.Such groupstendtoinstitutionalizethemselvesonthemodeloffamilies,buttohavean essentiallypublicidentity.
Profit-seeking "economic" exchange was so great a leap that initially it seemstohavebeenconductedmainlyinassociationwithpublicinstitutions,atleast nominally. The first documented "households" to be economically managed were thoseofMesopotamia'stemples.Tobesure, Lamberg-Karlovsky(1996,80ff .)has traced their evolution out of what began as the chief's household from the sixth throughthethirdmillennium,followedbypalacesthatemergedfromtempleprecinctscirca2750BC.Theselargeinstitutionalhouseholdsdevelopedacommunitywideidentity,especiallyastheyabsorbeddependentlaborsuchasthatofthewar widowsandorphans,theblindorinfirmtakenoutoftheirfamilyenvironmenton theland,andalsoslavescapturedinraiding.Itisinthemthatthefirststandardized bulkproductionwasorganizedtoyieldacommercialsurplus.
Temples of Enterprise
SouthernMesopotamiawasinauniquelyresource-dependentposition.Itslandconsistedofrichalluvialsoildepositedbyriversoverthemillennia,butlackedcopper, tin, lapis and other stone, or even much hardwood. The region needed to obtain thesematerialsfromdistantsitesrangingfromtheIranianplateautocentralAnatolia.Inthemid-fourthmillenniumBCtheSumerianscreatedfortifiedoutpostsupthe Euphratestothenorth,butarchaeologistshavefoundthattheyhadtobeabandoned afteracenturyorso.Militaryconquestwastooexpensiveameanstoobtaindistant rawmaterialsandtransportthemtothesouthernMesopotamianeconomiccore.
Sumerian cities fought among themselves in the fourth, third, and even secondmillenniaBC,butacquisitionofforeignmaterialsinlargequantityoverlong distances had to be organized on a reciprocal and voluntary basis with Anatolia and the Iranian plateau, while trade with the Indus Valley was conducted mainly ontheislandofDilmun.Peacefultrademeantenterprise,requiringsouthernMesopotamia-Sumer-tohaveexportstooffer.Becauseofthelargesumsinvolved,city templesandpalacesplayedthedominantroleasproducersandsuppliersofgoods. Ships and overland caravans were outfitted and provided with textiles and other productstoexchangefortherawmaterialslackingintheSumeriancore.
Inrecentyears,Assyriologistshavereconstructedhowthissystemworked,using as evidence royal inscriptions and the archives of palace officials and merchantentrepreneurs. Imperial conquerors in time imposed the payment of tribute and taxes on defeated populations, but city-temples and palaces did not levy taxes as such. Rather, they supported themselves by their own workshops, large herds of animalsandmeansoftransport,andbyleasingoutfieldsandworkshops,muchas Athens later would do with its Laurion silver mines. Their dependent labor force producedtextilesforexport,andbeerfordomesticsale. Theabsenceofeitherexportorlocalsalesdocumentssuggeststhatthetemples andpalacesadvancedthesecommoditiestomerchantsforlaterpaymentuponthe returnfromavoyage,afterafive-yearperiod,oratharvesttimefordomesticsales forpaymentincrops.Intheearlystagesoflong-distancetradetheyweregivenrationsor"salaries"andsuppliedwithdonkeysbythetemples,asuresignoftheir public role (Frankfort 1951, 67) . In time these merchants accumulated capital of theirown,whichtheyusedalongwiththatofprivatebackers(typicallytheirrelatives).Mostoftheirarchiveshavebeenexcavatedintempleorpalaceprecincts,indicatingthattherewasnoideaofconflictofinterestwithregardtotheirpositionin thetempleorpalacebureaucracy,whichseemstohaveremainedmainlyinthehands of leading families. Their personal business archives are found along with public administrativerecords.Itisclearthatthewaytobecomeanentrepreneurwasto interfacewiththeselargeinstitutions.ThatiswhatmadeMesopotamianeconomies "mixed"ratherthanstatist(runbypublicbureaucraciessuchasthe"templestate" postulated in the 1920s) or strictly "private enterprise," as assumed by the older generationofeconomicmodernists.
The public institutions established relationships with well-placed individuals, whose title-Sumerian damgar, Babylonian tamkarum-usually is translated as "merchant" or, by Babylonian times, "entrepreneur." Applying Israel Kirzner's (1979 ,39)definitionoftheentrepreneur'srole,JohannesRenger(2000 points outthatitisaseventeenth-centuryFrenchtermdenoting"apersonwhoenteredinto acontractualrelationshipwiththegovernmentfortheperformanceofaserviceor thesupplyofgoods.Thepriceatwhichthecontractwasvaluedwasfixedandthe entrepreneursboretherisksofprofitandlossfromthebargain."Anentrepreneur seekseconomicgaineitherwithhisownmoneyor,moreoften,operatingwithborrowedfundsormanagingtheassetsofothers(includingpublicinstitutions)tomake somethingoverforhimselfbycuttingexpensesorcreatingabusinessinnovation.In Babylonia,thepalaceleasedlandandworkshopsatstipulatedrents,andadvanced textilesandotherhandicraftstomerchantsengagedinlong-distancetrade.Inthe processofdevelopingthisenterprise,administratorsandentrepreneurscreatedthe managerialelementsforlarge-scaleproductionandmarketexchangetosqueezeout aneconomicsurplusandreinvestittoobtainfurthergains.
Debt Relationships
Oneseestracesofatugofwarbetweenlocalmagnatesandthecentralpalace,not unlikethatbetweenthebaronsandthekingsofEnglandinthetwelfthcenturyof the modern era. An important role of palace rulers, for instance, was to prevent interest-bearing debt-and subsequent foreclosure, especially by palace revenue collectors-fromstrippingawaythecitizenry'sbasicmeansofself-support.Royal "clean slates" preserved economic solvency by annulling agrarian "barley" debts (but not commercial "silver" debts), reversing land forfeitures, and freeing debt pledgesfrombondage.Thismeantthatindebtedcitizenscouldlosetheirlibertyand self-supportlandsonlytemporarily. 
Documentation of Early Entrepreneurial Activity
Oursourcesobligeustorelyalmostexclusivelyonarchivesandinscriptionsfrom Babylonia, Assyria, and the neighboring lands for documentation regarding early economicorganization.LittleearlyprimarydatasurvivefromEgypt,whichinany eventremainedmuchmorecommerciallyself-containedthanotherpartsoftheNear East,saveforitsmilitaryincursions.Weknowfrompictorialsourcesthattherewere markets,butaccordingtoBleiberg (1995, Theoligarchicethicpreferredseizingwealthabroadtocreatingitathome.The majorwaystomakefortuneswerebyconquest,raidingandpiracy,slavecapture andslavedealing,moneylending,taxfarming,andkindredactivitiesmorepredatory thanentrepreneurial.Gainingwealthbyextractingitfromotherswasdeemedtobe atleastasnoble(ifnotmoreso)thandoingsocommercially,whichwasdeemed to be equally exploitative without the exercise of personal bravery. "When I was youngitwassafeanddignifiedtobearichman,"complainedIsocratesinAthens duringthatcity-state'sstrugglesbetweendemocracyandoligarchy;"nowonehas todefendoneselfagainstthechargeofbeingrichasifitweretheworstofcrimes" (Antidosis 159-60,quotedinHumphreys1978,297).Theresultofthisdisparaging attitudeisthatalthoughentrepreneursstoodattheeconomy'sfulcrumpoints-managing estates, organizing shipping and public construction, operating workshops, andprovisioningarmies-theyworkedinanenvironmentlessandlessconducive tosuchactivitiesoverthecourseofantiquity,andsoughttobecomemoreleisurely rentiersandphilanthropists.Thebroadeffectwastoexhausttheregionsabsorbed intoantiquity'sempires.
The moral is that what is most important for society is the institutional set of rules and social values that govern how entrepreneurs gain wealth. The path doesnotalwaysleadupwardtowardhigherproductivity,tosaynothingofgreater efficiency for social development or even survival. There are many ways to seek economicgain. "Indeed,"observesBaumol(1990,894) ,"attimestheentrepreneur mayevenleadaparasiticalexistencethatisactuallydamagingtotheeconomy."By classicalantiquitythethreemostlucrativeareasofgainseekingweretaxfarming, publicbuildingcontracts,andprovisioningthepalaces,temples,andarmy.Building afortuneinvolvedinterfacingwiththestateunderconditionswherethesurplustook theformoftribute,usury,landgrabbing,andprofiteeringfrompublicadministrative position. The domestic surplus, and ultimately the land itself, was obtained increasinglyviainterest-bearingdebt(oftenviaforeclosureorforcedsale)andby conquest.
Ifenterpriseisdefinedaspartofanoverallsocialsystemthatsetsitsrules,one findsashiftoccurringfromtheBronzeAgeNearEasttoclassicalGreeceandRome fromproductivetounproductiveenterprise."Ifentrepreneursaredefined,simply, tobepersonswhoareingeniousandcreativeinfindingwaysthataddtotheirown wealth,power,andprestige," Baumolconcludes(1990,897-98) ,"thenitistobe expectedthatnotallofthemwillbeoverlyconcernedwithwhetheranactivitythat achievesthesegoalsaddsmuchorlittletothesocialproductor,forthatmatter,even whetheritisanactualimpedimenttoproduction(thisnotiongoesback,atleast,to Veblen1904)." 2 Rome'swealthiestandmostprominentfamiliessoughttomakeasmanyclients, debtors, and slaves as dependent as possible through force, usury, and control of theland.Thispredatoryrentierspiritledtothecentury-longSocialWar(133-29 BC)thatsawtheRepublicpolarizeeconomically,pavingthewayforthesubsequent empiretogivewaytoserfdom.Onelooksinvainfortheideathatprofit-seeking enterprisemightdrivesocietyforwardtoachievehigherlevelsofproductionandlivingstandards.Nomajormindssetaboutdevelopingapolicyforsocietyoreventhe oligarchyasaclasstogetrichbyeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentofaninternal market.
Some Myths regarding the Genesis of Enterprise
Ifacolloquiumonearlyentrepreneurshadbeenconvenedacenturyago,mostparticipantswouldhaveviewedtradersasoperatingontheirown,barteringatprices thatsettledatamarketequilibriumestablishedspontaneously,inresponsetofluctuatingsupplyanddemand.AccordingtotheAustrianeconomistCarlMenger,money emergedasindividualsandmerchantsinvolvedinbartercametoprefersilverand copperasconvenientmeansofpayment,storesofvalue,andstandardsbywhichto measureotherprices.ButinsteadofsupportingtheAustrianSchool'sindividualistic scenarioforhowcommercialpracticesdeveloped-trade,moneyandcredit,interest andpricing-historyshowsthattheydonotemergespontaneouslyamongindividuals"truckingandbartering."Rather,investmentforthepurposeofcreatingprofits,thechargingofinterest,creationofapropertymarketandevenaproto-bond market(fortempleprebends)firstemergedinthetemplesandpalacesofSumerand Babylonia.
Itnowhasbeenestablishedthatfromthird-millenniumMesopotamiathrough classical antiquity the minting of precious metal of specified purity occurred undertheaegisoftemplesorotherpublicagencies,notprivatesuppliers.Theword money itselfderivesfromRome'stempleofJunoMoneta,whereitwascoinedin early times. Silver money was part of the pricing system, developed by the large institutionstoestablishstableratiosfortheiraccount-keepingandforwardplanning.Majorpriceratios(includingtherateofinterest)initiallywereadministered inroundnumbersforeaseofcalculation (Renger2000,2002 HudsonandWunsch 2004 
Some Contrasts between Enterprise in Antiquity and Today
A number of differences between antiquity's economic practices and those of the modernworldshouldbeborneinmindwithregardtothechangingcontextforenterprise.Ratherthanbeingautonomous,handicraftworkshopswerelocatedonbasicallyself-sufficientlandedestates,includingthoseofthelargepublicinstitutions. Suchindustrywasself-financedratherthanusingcredit,whichwasextendedmainly forlong-distanceandbulktrade.
From Babylonian times down through imperial Rome, commercial earnings tended to be invested in land. Yet there was no land speculation based on rising prices.Atmost,subsistencelandwasshiftedtogrowingcashcrops,headedbyolive oilandwineintheMediterranean,anddatesintheNearEast,harvestedincreasinglybyslavesworkingatlowercost.
We do not find banking intermediaries lending out people's savings to entrepreneurialborrowers.ThroughouttheNearEast,whathavebeencalled"banking families"suchastheEgibi(describedbyWunschinthisvolume)arebestthoughtof asgeneralentrepreneurs.Theydidholddepositsandmadeloans,buttheypaidthe samerateofinteresttodepositorsastheychargedfortheirloans(normally20per-centannually As noted above, however, the most recent generation of economic historians hascriticizedFinleyforbeingtooextremeindoubtingtheexistenceofgain-seeking investmentand"modern"economicmotivation.TherearemanyexamplesofBaumol's"productiveenterprise,"especiallyintheNearEast.Whatremainsaccepted isthatusuryandslaverybecameincreasinglypredatoryandcorrosivepractices,and thatwarswerefoughtmainlytostripthewealthofprosperousregionsasbootyto distributeathome.
Entrepreneurs, Predators, and Financiers
Howmanyoftheseactivitiesweretrulyentrepreneurialintheproductiveandinnovativesenseunderstoodtoday?Thekeytodefiningproductiveentrepreneursshould betheircontributiontogeneratinganeconomicsurplus,notmerelytransferringit or,evenworse,strippingtheeconomy.Warmakingandpiracytoseizebootyand slaveswerecommonpredatoryactivities,andthelargestfortunesknowninantiquityweremadebyconqueringoradministeringforeignlandsandcollectingtaxes fromdefeatedpopulations.Sonotallfortuneswereamassedthroughenterprise,and notallmanagerswereentrepreneurs.
Evenwhenentrepreneursplayedanominallyproductiverole,theyworkedin a war-oriented environment. A major source of fortunes was provisioning of the army,mainlywithfoodbutalsowithmanufacturedgoods.Frank(1933,291)notes thatduring150-80BC"wehearofonlyoneman . . . whogainedwealthbymanufacturing,andthatwasinpubliccontractsforweaponsduringtheSocialWar(Cicero, in Pis. 87-89)." On the retail level, Polanyi's paradigmatic example of free price-makingmarketswasthesmall-scalefood-sellerswhofollowedGreekarmies. Provisioningfoodwasindeedthemainactivity,butmuchmoreeconomicallyaggressivewerethepubliccontractorswhosuppliedRomanarmiesonthewholesale level.Contractswereletoutatauctionsthatbecamenotoriously"fixed"bythefirst centuryBC.
Financial extraction is a form of enterprise very different from industrial investment. Evolving largely as a by-product of collecting public fees and taxes in Babylonia,moneylendinggrewfromasideactivityofthetamkaru toamajorfocus oftheRomanpublicani. Weber(1976,316) referstoRome'spublicancompanies asenterprises,butmostwriterstodaydepictthemaspredatory.MacMullen (1974, (51) (52) notestheincreasinglyagrarianfocusofmoneylending,citingRostovtzeff's calculation that mortgage loans yielded "either fields foreclosed or interest in the neighborhoodof6to8percent.Theratecomparedfavorablywiththe6percent (atleastinItaly)thatonemightreasonablyhopeforfrommoneyinvestedinagriculture.Atthat,one'smoneydoubledinadozenyears.Whytakeachanceintrade?" Theeffectwastodivertcapitaltoagricultureandusury.
Theremaybeafinelinedemarcatinganinvestorfromanentrepreneur,butthe latter certainly must play a more active managerial role than rentiers such as the Old Babylonian naditu heiresses investing their inheritance by making loans and buyingrevenue-yieldingproperties(althoughYoffee1995referstothesewomenas entrepreneursandsomenodoubtactedinthisway).Cato'streatiseonagriculture acknowledgedthattradeandusuryweremorelucrativethanfarming,butwarned thatcommercewasriskyandmoneylendingwasconsideredimmoral.Landowners neededmanagerialtalent,butarenotusuallydeemedentrepreneurs.Arentallevy orpropertyforeclosureisnotprofitearnedinproduction,excepttotheextentthat landuseisupgraded(whichdidindeedoccur,todatepalmsintheNearEastandto olivegrowinginItaly).
The key to whether engaging in a trade was entrepreneurial depends on the degreetowhichoneworkedforoneselforasanagentoremployeesharingdirectly intheprofitsofbuyingandselling.Andfurthermore,althoughself-employedcraftsmenoftendoubledassellersoftheirwares,theywouldnotqualifyasentrepreneurs unlesstheyalsoactedasmanagersandorganizersofacomplexsystem.Humphreys (1978,153)pointsouttheproblemofdeemingcraftsmenentrepreneurial:
Torunaworkshopinan"entrepreneurial"spiritwouldhaverequiredsupervisionby theowner.Instead,theworkshopsofwhichweknowdetailsweremanagedbyslaves orfreedman,andtheownerdrewafixedincomefromthem.Therewasnointerestin expansion. . . . Demosthenes' father owned two workshops, one making beds and the otherknives:therewasnoconnectionbetweenthem.Pasion'sbankandshield-factory wereequallyunconnectedanditissignificantthatwhilePasion,anex-slave,evidently devotedconsiderableenergyandpersonalattentiontothebank,hissonApollodorus (whoreceivedAtheniancitizenshipwithhisfather)acquiredthreeestates,preferredthe shield-factorytothebankashisshareoftheinheritance,anddevotedhisenergiestopoliticsandtheshowyperformanceofliturgies,inthestyleofanAtheniangentleman.As metictradersandbankersbecamemoreimportanttotheprosperityandfood-supplyof thecity,themostsuccessfulofthemwererewardedwithcitizenprivileges,cameunder pressureforgiftsandcontributionstothedemos,andtendedtoadopttheethosofthe richcitizensratherthanencouragethelattertoventureintonewfieldsofinvestment.
Therewasabasicconflictbetweensocialambitionforhighstatusandthearistocratic antipathy to engaging directly in business ventures. "Although Aristotle asserted that 'unnatural' chrematistike (money-making) knew no bounds," Humphreysconcludes,"thegeneralimpressiongivenbyoursourcesisthatthemajority ofAthenianswerequitereadytogiveuptheefforttomakemoneyassoonasthey couldaffordacomfortablerentier existence,andthateventhefewwhocontinued toexpandtheiroperationscouldnotpassonthesamespirittotheirsons.Theresult was small-scale, disconnected business ventures, assessed by the security of their returnsratherthantheirpotentialityforexpansion."
The most typical form of enterprise remained long-distance trade. Its organizational pattern changed little from the epoch when Mesopotamia's temples and palacesprovidedmerchantswithcommoditiesormoney.Drawingaparallelwith the medieval Italian commenda and compagnia, as well as the Arabic muqarada practice, Larsen(1974,470) viewssuchentrepreneursasadministeringadvancesof moneyorinventoriesfromtheirbackers.
Opportunities for making money evolved as a by-product of this mercantile role. In Old-Sumerian documents, Leemans (1950, 11) notes, "damkara are only foundastraders.Butwhenprivatebusinessbegantoflourishafterthebeginning ofthethirddynastyofUr [2112 ,thetamkarum wastheobviousperson to assume the function of giver of credit." By the time of Hammurabi's Babylonian laws, in many cases "tamkarum cannot denote a traveling trader, but must be a money-lender." Leemans concludes (22) Reflectingthedisdaininwhichactiveparticipationinmoney-seekingcommerce washeldbyantiquity'saristocraticethic,mostoftheshippersengagedinRome's maritime trade were foreigners or ex-slaves owning one or two small sailing vessels.Whethertheshipperwaswealthyorapettytradesman,explainsJones (1964, 868) ,he"rarelydependedonhisowncapital,exclusively,preferringtoraisenautical loans,whichwouldpartiallycoverhimagainstlossbystorm.Forsuchloans,since thecreditorstoodtheriskoflosinghismoneyiftheshipwerewreckedorthecargo jettisoned,therateofinterestwassubjecttonolegallimit,untilJustinianin528 fixedthemaximumat12percent.perannum,asagainst8percent.forordinary commercialloansand6percent.forprivateloans."
Undertakingriskdoesnotinitselfmakeanactivityentrepreneurial.Nearlyeveryonewassubjecttorisk,andlawstookapragmaticapproachinrecognizingthis fact.Cultivatorsandsharecroppersfacedthepossibilityofdrought,flooding,and militaryhostilities.AtleastintheNearEast,rentsandfeesowedtothelargeinstitutionsandothercreditorswereannulledinsuchcircumstances.Inthecommercial sphere,whenshipswerelostatseaortheircaravanswererobbed,commerciallaws from Babylonia down through Roman times freed traveling merchants from the obligationtorepaytheirbackers.
Thewell-to-doaccordinglyspreadtheirriskbytakingpartialinvestmentshares in many ventures, much as Lloyd's insurance does in modern times. Plutarch describesCatoas"requir[ing]hisborrowerstoformalargecompany(epi koinonia)," summarizesD'Arms(1981,39),"andthenwhentherewerefiftypartners,andas manyshipsforsecurity,hetookoneshareinthecompanyhimselfandwasrepresented by Quintio, a freedman of his, who accompanied his clients in all of their ventures.Inthiswayhisentiresecuritywasnotimperiled,butonlyasmallpartof it,andhisprofitswerelarge." PlutarchdescribesCatoasanticipatingwhatWeberwouldcalltheProtestant ethic. He was a stingy and self-abnegating man who did not enjoy the riches he made,refusingtobuyexpensiveclothesorfoodforhimself,preferringtodrinkthe samelowlywineashisworkmen,andturningoutoldandworn-outslaveswhen they no longer could do enough work to justify their support. In his public role he cut costs, opposed corruption, and increased the price that Rome received for farmingoutitstaxeswhileminimizingthepricesgivenoutinpubliccontracts."To inclinehissontobeofhiskindoftemper,heusedtotellhimthatitwasnotlike aman,butratherlikeawidowtolessenanestate.Butthestrongestindicationof Cato'savaricioushumorwaswhenhetooktheboldnesstoaffirmthathewasamost wonderful,nay,agodlikeman,wholeftmorebehindhimthanhehadreceived." TheemphasisthatPlutarchgivestohisbehaviorsuggeststhatsucheconomiccalculationwasexceptional.
Tosumup,entrepreneurseitherheadedwealthyfamiliesorsoughtfortunesby managingotherpeople'smoney,whichtypicallywasprovidedsubjecttoastipulated return.Regardlessofthesourceoftheircapital,theycoordinatedacomplexsetof relationshipswhoseinstitutionalstructureevolvedthroughoutthesecondandfirst millenniaBC.
Social Status of Merchants and Entrepreneurs
InBabyloniaafterabout1800BC,Rengerexplains(2000,155;seealso1984,64), theentrepreneurstowhomthepalaceleasedfields,herds,andworkshopstended to be "members of the elite or upper classes." The title of damgar or tamkarum merchant presupposed social status and connections to the palace or temple bureaucracy,administeringfranchisesin"aformofeconomicmanagementtermedby F. R.Krausas'Palastgeschäft.'"Somemanagersworkedinthepalacebureaucracy, butothersworkedentirelyontheirownaccount. Renger(2000,178) 
The Public Context in Which Entrepreneurs Operated
BythetimeAssyriadevelopedfar-flungtraderelationswithAsiaMinorinthenineteenthcenturyBC,privatemerchantshadcometoplayamuchlargerrolethaninthe south,inSumerandBabylonia. Larsen(1974,469) describestheAssyriantradeas "venturing,i.e.allshipmentsweresentabroadwithoutthesenderbeingguaranteed acertainpricefortheminadvance."Headds:"Theeconomicallydecisiveelement intheAssyriansocietyisnotfoundonthe'statelevel,'eventhoughtheroleplayed bythetemplesisstillsomewhatobscure.Instead,thetradeisclearlyorganizedvia agreatnumberoflargekinship-basedgroups,called'houses,'whichwemayprovisionallydescribeas'firms.' "Mercantileguildsfunctionedastradeassociationsrepresentingmerchantsvis-à-vislocalauthorities,reducingtherisksinvolvedbycreating an"underlyingpatternofpermanentrepresentation,partnerships,and'factories.' " MovingwestwardfromtheNearEasttotheMediterraneanwefindmorepredatory and corrosive economic strategies as society became more "individualistic," thatis,oligarchic.YeteveninRome,wherethelinksbetweenpositivecommercial enterprise and the state were looser than elsewhere (Weber 1976, 316) , the most successfulentrepreneurialpathwastoworkinconjunctionwithpublicinstitutions. Contractsforpublicworksandserviceshavebeentracedbacktothefourthcentury BC,firsttoprovidesuppliesforreligiousrituals,publicbuilding,andsimilarcivic projects,andthenfortheoperationofpublicenterprises(fromfieldstominesand workshops)andcollectionofpublicfeesandrevenues.Provisioningthearmysoon becamethelargestcategoryofcontracts,alongwithcollectingtaxesfromdefeated lands. LackingapermanentpublicorroyalbureaucracysuchascharacterizedtheNear Eastern mixed economies, the government needed private suppliers for services it couldnotperformitselfandreliedonprivateindividualstocollectitstaxesandadministeritsdomains.Rome'sabsenceofcivicoversightorevensignificanttaxation ofbusinessenabledbusinessmentoprofiteeratpublicexpense."Thepublican'schief profitscamefromtheultro tributa (contractsforgoodsandservices,especiallyarmy supplies),"summarizesBadian (1972, 24) .Inviewofthescaleinvolved,evenasmall rateofprofitcouldproducealargefortune.ButRome'sfinancialknightsweremost notoriousfortheirpredatorybehavior.Livy(XLV18,4)complainedfamouslythat "wheretherewasapublicanus,therewasnoeffectivepubliclawandnofreedom forthesubjects."Describinghowpublicantaxcollectorsenslaveddebtors,selling manyinthemarketonDelos, Badian(1972,33) 
Financing Enterprise
Many economic historians (e.g., Andreau 1999 , 151-51, and earlier Humphreys 1978 Veenhof(1999,55)describesthedriveforfinancialgainbyAssyriancaravans bringing"tinandwoollentextilesintoAnatoliainordertoconvertthem,directlyor indirectly,intosilver,whichwasinvariablyshippedbacktoAssur.Afternecessary paymentshadbeenmade(expenses,taxes,debts,interest,dividend),muchofwhat remainedwasagainusedforcommercialpurposes,eitherdirectly,bycontributingto orequippinganewcaravan,orindirectly,byinvestingitinafirmorissuingaloan toatrader."Thistradedevelopedsuchmoderncreditinnovationsas"promissory noteswhichdonotmentionthecreditorbyname,butrefertohimastamkarum, 'the merchant/creditor.' In a few cases such notes add at the end the phrase 'the bearerofthistabletistamkarum.'Thisclausesuggeststhepossibilityofatransfer ofdebt-notesandofcedingclaims,whichwouldmakeitaprecursoroflater'bearer cheques' "(Veenhof1999,83).
Mostagrariandebtswereowedtoroyalcollectorsofrents,fees,andtaxesor managersofpublicenterprises(including"alewomen"whosoldbeerapparently advancedbythetemplesorpalaces).Royalcleanslatesalleviatedtheriskthatthey mightnotbeabletopaytheirdebtsasaresultofnaturaldisasterorwarfare.Hammurabi'slawsprescribedthatiflandswereflooded,thecultivatorwasfreedfromthe obligationtopayrent.Annullingthesedebtsalsocanceledthosewhichroyalagents andleaseholdersowedtothepalace.Intimesofweakrulers,itseemsthattheseindividualswereabletokeeptherentsandotherfeesinanyevent.
With respect to the situation in classical antiquity, Finley (1973, 141) cited threecharacteristicsmakingtheGreekandRomaneconomiespremodern.Firstwas theabsenceofproductiveloans-aviewthatsubsequenteconomichistorianshave foundextreme,tobesure,especiallywhenthespreadofNearEasternmodelsisrecognized.Secondwasthefactthatalthough"therewasendlessmoneylendingamong both Greeks and Romans . . . all lenders were rigidly bound by the actual amount ofcashonhand;therewasnot,inotherwords,anymachineryforthecreation of credit throughnegotiableinstruments. . . .InGreeklawsaleswerenotlegalandbindinguntilthesalepricehadbeenpaidinfull;creditsalestooktheformoffictitious loans."Finally,mostloanswereshort-term,mainlytofinancevoyagesoroverland tradingexpeditions.
TherehasbeenatendencytoassumethatwhatFinleyisdescribingmusthave beenthe"primitive"casefromtheoutset.Butasnotedabove,thesegeneralitiesdo notwellapplytotheNearEast,especiallyforthecomplexfinancialarrangements foundinNeo-Babylonianpractice.TheEgibiarchiveinparticularstandsinsharp contrasttotheviewbythepastgenerationofeconomichistoriansofclassicalGreece andRome,whofindalmostnoproductivelendingfortangiblecapitalinvestment. TheEgibitookoutantichreticloans-thatis,advanceswherethecollateralthatsecuredtheloangeneratedtheinterestbeingcharged.Thisisthesamestrategyusedby manyrealestateinvestorstoday,asexpressedinthemotto,"Rentisforpayinginterest."Thefamilyalsopledgedurbanproperty(the"HouseoftheCrownPrince")to obtainacommerciallineofcredit.Finally,theirpartnershipssometimesextended overmorethanonegeneration,asdescribedbyWunschinthisvolume. TheinabilityofhistoriansofGreeceandRometofindanythingsosophisticated makes the classical economies appear as the end-result of decay into more rudimentaryfinancialarrangements. AsFinley(1973,108) famouslynotedinthemost extremestatementofthisview:
Therewasnoclearconceptionofthedistinctionbetweencapitalcostsandlaborcosts, noplannedploughingbackofprofits,nolong-termloansforproductivepurposes.The importinthiscontextoftheshort-termloan(liketheshort-termtenancy)cannotbe exaggerated. From one end of antiquity to another, one can easily count the known examples of borrowing on property for purposes of purchase or improvement. The mortgagewasadisaster("mortgagingtheoldhomestead"),ashort-termpersonalloan designedto"coverdeficienciesinthesupplyofnecessitiesoccasionedgenerallybysome emergencywhichhasmadeunexpecteddemandsupontheresourcesoftheborrower," notadeliberatedeviceforraisingmoneyatalowrateinordertoinvestatahigherrate, [whichis]themainfunctionofthemodernbusinessmortgage. Andreau(1999,147-48) findsafewscatteredexamplesofRomanbusinessmenborrowingtotidetheiroperationsoverormakingdelayedpaymentofafinal balanceowedtobuyabusiness.However,hesumsup:"DidRomanfinanciersdirect mostoftheireffortstowardseconomiclifeinordertocreateaneffectiveinstrument for investments? Did any financial establishments specialize in the promotion of productiveloans?Theanswertobothquestionsmustdefinitelybeno." OnedeterrentwasthefactthatGreekandRomanenterpriseswereorganized aspartnerships,aswouldcharacterizemosttradingcompaniesthroughoutEurope downtotheseventeenthcentury."Everypartnerwasheldliableforthefullamount ofanydebtand . . . thepartnershipcametoanendatthedeathofanypartner,"Frank explains (1940, 217) ."Undersuchstrictlimitationslargebusinessenterpriseswere not apt to prosper." Walbank (1969, 48) likewise cites the absence of permanent joint-stockcorporationsasdiscouragingenterprise:"Becauseoftherisksentailed, itwasalwayscostlytoraisecapitalforatradingventure;interestrateswerehigh becausetheriskrunwaspersonal."Romanlawdidrecognizethatthelargesums involvedinpublicbuildingprojectsrequiredcorporateorganization,andonmuch thesamelogicthepublicani knightsalsowereempoweredtoorganizedcompanies toconductpublicenterprise(includingtaxfarming),aboveallthatassociatedwith militaryprovisioningandotherimperialspending.(Nicollet1966andBadian1972 describetheseactivities.) However,notesFrank(1933,350) ,"Romanlawpersisted indiscouragingjointstockcompanieswithlimitedliabilityinbusinessnotdirectly servingthestate,"and"firmsdealinginstatecontractsweregivenbusinessforonly five-yearterms."(SeealsoD'Arms1981,41.) 3 Alsolimitingthepotentialtakeoffwastheabsenceofpapercredit.Therewas nopublicdebttomanage.BudgetdeficitspromptedtheRomanemperorstoadulteratethecoinage,nottomonetizetheirspendingbycreatingpubliccreditasnational Treasuriesandcentralbanksdotoday.
These institutional constraints limited the buildup of capital reserves in mercantile undertakings and gave them an ad hoc character. The result, summarizes Frank(1940,28) ,wasthat"partnershipsbasedonthefullliabilityofeachmember could hardly grow to great size." Under the empire, "We hear of no bankers of importance. . . .Inthehousesofthenoblestheoldcustomstillprevailedoftrusting financialmatterstopersonalslavesandfreedmen,sothattherewaslittleroomfor investmentbanking;andinRome'seconomicstructuretherewasnoplaceforcorporationbanking."This"ledtobusinesssuccessnotbeingheldinanyesteem . . . the only occupations befitting senators were agriculture, and civil or military office. Lucrativebusinessinshipping,industry,andbankingrestedalmostentirelyinthe handsofforeignersandfreedmen.Andtosuchpeoplesocialpositiondidnotcome, whateverthescaleoftheirprofits."
FreedmenplayedakeyroleinRomanenterpriseandbecamesomeofRome's mostsuccessfulentrepreneurswhenelitefamiliesprovidedthemwithapeculium, observesDavidJones (2006, ,but"didnotproducea'middleclass'ofbusi-nessmen."Aftergettingtheirstart,"non-economicvaluesheldsway."Thesoleupwardmobilitythatex-slavesenjoyedwastoapethelandedaristocracyasbestthey could."Trimalchiomadeaseamlesstransitionfromtradinginmixedcargoes('wine, bacon,beans,perfumesandslaves')tosettlingdownonacountryestateandprovidingfinanceforanothergenerationofex-slaveentrepreneurs."Thissimplyemulated what the philosopher Seneca "described [as] the characteristics of the 'fortunate man':ahandsomefamily,afinehouse,plentyoflandundercultivationandplenty ofmoneyoutonloan(familiam formosam habet et domum pulchram, multum serit, multum fenerat).Elsewherehesaysthattherichman'hasgoldfurniture . . . alarge book of loans (magnus kalendarii liber) . . . plenty of suburban property . . . ' [Sen., Epist.41.7; 87.7,citedinJones2006,173.] Anditwaslandandmoneyoutonloan thatmadeupSeneca'sownwealth."
DescribingthefreedmenwhobecamebankersinPuteoli,thegrainandexport emporiumontheBayofNaples,170milessouthofRome,Jones (2006, 165) finds: "The business of the Sulpicii was built around the provision of small, short-term securedloans.ThereisnoevidenceintheMurecinearchivetosuggestthattheSulpiciiortheirdepositorsmademedium-orlong-termloansforcapitalprojectssuch astheconstructionofships,buildingsorworkshops.Noristhereanysignthatthe Sulpiciiortheirdepositorslentmoneyforhigh-risk,high-rewardmaritimeventures. Furthermorethebankoperatedonalocalbasis."Theirloanmarketwaslocal,despitethefactthattheytookindepositsandlentcashtomembersoftheimperial household."Thereisnosuggestionthattheacquisitionofadditionalfundsbythe elite furthered, or could have furthered, the expansion of trade and industry," he concludes (2006, 174) ."ItwastakenforgrantedbyRomancommentatorsandtheir audiencesthattheRomanelitetooknointerestincommercialactivitiesanddidnot considerinvestmentintradeandindustryasanappropriateuseoftheircapital."It was a rather thoughtless extractive spirit with little concept of economic growth. ThisexplainsthefeatureofanciententerprisenotedbyBaumol:thefailuretocommercializetechnology,whichbeganonlyinmedievaltimes.
Entrepreneurs, Debt Abuses, and Shifting Property Relations
"Stretchingtheenvelope"ofwhatisdeemedlegalalwayshasbeenmostpronounced inthefinancialsphere.Itwasdebtforeclosurethatfirstturnedfamilyself-support landintoabsentee-ownedproperty.Plutarch'smelodramaticdepictionofaSpartan father disinheriting his son and bequeathing his land to an acquaintance finds its counterpart over a thousand years earlier in Babylonia. To circumvent the traditionalsanctionsthatprevented(andindeed,protected)citizensfromalienatingtheir subsistence land outside of their families, Babylonian creditors (and also those of Nuzi to the northwest) hit upon the tactic of getting their debtors to adopt them as"sons"andhencelegitimateheirstotheirlandinpaymentfordebt.These"fake adoptions"enabledcreditorstostartmonopolizingtheland,disenfranchisingcitizensandhencethecommunity'sfightingforce.
ThelawsofHammurabi(1750BC)andhisdynasty's"economicorder"(misharum or andurarum) proclamations, culminating in that of Ammisaduqa (1648 BC),soughttopreservestabilityandastrongmilitarycapabilitybyannullingagrarianandpersonaldebts,preventingcreditorsfromreducingcitizenspermanentlyto debtbondage.NoequallybroadcontextforthelawisfoundinGreeceorRome. Without"divinerulership"orothercentralauthoritytochecknarrowself-interest, Romeinparticularbecameharshlycreditor-orientedandoligarchic.
Retailtradealwayshasbeennotoriousforcheating,andcrookedpracticessuch asusingfalseweightsandmeasuresarerifefromBabylonian"wisdomliterature" down through biblical proverbs. But what is most noteworthy in classical times is large-scale fraud. The earliest description of the Roman publicani appears in a senatorial prosecution. When the Treasury was strapped during Rome's war with Carthage, suppliers obtained a government agreement to insure all supplies once theywereloadedontoships.TwoeminentEtruriancontractors,T.Pomponiousand M. Postumius,loaded"worthlessgoodsonboardunseaworthyshipsand[claimed] theinsurancesumforarmysupplieswhentheshipssank." Badian(1972,17-18) remarksthat"theincident . . . showsthepublicani,onpracticallytheirfirstexplicitappearanceinourrecord,alreadyorganizedasanextra-legalpressuregroup,already puttingprivateprofitabovethepublicinterest,andwillingtodefendamemberof theirclass,nomatterhowbadhiscase."Cicero'ssurvivingdefensepleadingsshow the publicani continuing to stick together in a tacit compact of mutual support. Therethuswaslittlepeerpressuretobehavebetter-andifanything,mutualsupportforthemostrapaciouspractices.
Rome'smajorattempttopreventcommercialabusesoccurredin133BC,when Gaius Gracchus established a system of checks and balances whereby the Senate andthepublicani knightsweretoactasmutualchecksbyprosecutingeachother's misdeeds.Butinsteadofthefinancialclassturningintothe"jury"class,theknights colludedwithprovincialadministratorsformutualgain.ThecaseofVerresinSicilyshowedhowcrookedgovernorsandbusinessmenmadecorruptdealstogether. Cicero depicted him as a bad apple, and a time-honored strategy of businessmen has been to single out an individual as a scapegoat to be punished conspicuously sothattheotherscangoabouttheirbusinessasusual.Verresbecamethesacrificial lamb,immortalizedbyCicero'seloquentVerrinesspeeches.Butthesystemitselfhad gonebad,culminatingintheexcessesofBrutus,Caesar,andotherpatricianslooting Rome'sprovincesbylevyingextortionatetaxesandtributeandthenchargingexorbitantinterestonpaymentarrears. Badian(1972,107) describespublicancompaniesformingacartelthat"musthaveincludedthewholeupperorderofsocietyand oftheState,exceptforafewtraditionalaristocrats."Themoneywasspentmainly onbuyingdomesticRomanpoliticalsupport,aspublicadministrationandtheright to loot ended up being a lucrative source of wealth-the antithesis of productive enterprise.Itwassaidthataprovincialgovernor"hadtomakethreefortunesduringhisyear'sadministration,onetopayhisdebts,anotheronwhichtoretire,anda thirdtobribethejurorsintheinevitabletrialforextortion"(Walbank1969,7).The Senateprovedtooweakandindifferenttostopsuchabuses.Andinasmuchasthe richestsourcesoflootwerethemostproductiveregions,theeffectwastostriptheir capitalandstifleeconomicgrowthwherevertheempirereached.
From Commercial Entrepreneurship to Oligarchy
WhatiswidelydescribedastheindividualisticspiritofGreeceandRomewasprimarilyamilitaryandincreasinglyoligarchicethicofstatusandprestige.Itreliedon conquestandmoneylendingasthemainsourcesofgain,disdainingprofit-seeking commerce. The Theognid poetry of Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries BC reflectstheconservativearistocraticethic:
. . . thiscityisstillacity,buttrulythepeoplearedifferent. Thosewho,inthepast,knewneitherjusticenorlaws butworeoutthegoatskinswhichcoveredtheirsides andgrazedlikedeerontheoutskirtsofthecity, nowthesemenarethenobles(agathoi) . . . andthosewhobeforewereofthenobility(esthloi) nowtheyareinferiors(deiloi).
( Theognis53-58,inFigueiraandNagy1985,16) Commerceseemedakintomoney-grubbing,aviolationofthearistocraticethic reflected in Aristotle's attitude finding "natural" self-sufficient householding more socially acceptable than commerce (kapelike). Humphreys (1978, 144) finds this spiritreflectedin"theThebanlawthatanyonewhohadtradedinthemarketwithin thelasttenyearscouldnotholdpoliticaloffice [and] inthehostilityagainsttraders asforeignerscallouslyexploitingthehardshipofotherswhichflaredupinAthens whencornpricesrose.Atypeofinteractioninwhicheachpartywasexpectedto consideronlyhisownimmediateeconomicadvantagewasaflagrantcontradiction ofeveryconceptionofsociallife:themanwholivedbysuchtransactionscouldonly bean'outsider.' "TheironyisthatamajorfactorstiflingtheGreco-Romaneconomic takeoffwasthearistocraticdisdainforenterprise,productiveaswellaspredatory.
The Romans are credited with a genius for organization, but they devoted it mainly to organizing their army. The city's historians described its founders, RomulusandRemus,asferalchildrennurturedbyawolf,establishingacityofrefugebetweenitstwohillstoattractexiles,refugees,andcriminalswhoinduecourse becamethebasisofitscitizenarmy.BythesixthcenturyBCthecityhadbuiltsubstantialdefensivewallsandthelargesttempleinItaly.Thepreconditionsforacommercialtakeoffwerepresent,butapatricianoligarchygaineddominancethrough usuryandlandacquisition,withlittlethoughtthatreducingmuchofthepopulation tobondagewoulddestroythehomemarketneededtogrow.
Romanaffluence-literallya"flowingin"-stemmedlargelyfromslavecapture and booty hunting, usury, and tribute from defeated realms. Military to the end, as Frank (1933, 399) summarized, "the larger fortunes during the last fifty corruptyearsoftheRepublic[80-30BC]came,notfrombusiness,butfrommilitary returns,fromdealinginconfiscatedgoods,andfromvariousabusesofpower.To these sources are traceable the wealth of Lucullus, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, whoweretherichestRomansoftheperiod."
Intoday'seconomicterminologythiswasclassicrent-seekingbehavior.Instead ofhavingacommercialstrategy," ThearistocracythatdirectedRomanpolicyduringtheRepublicwasalmostwhollyagrarian-militaristic,"Frankconcluded(1940, 295) ."Clearly,itwasnotlessmovedbyaneconomicdrive,byself-seeking,andby greedthanthecommercialsocietiesoftoday.Butthegainsoughtwasofadifferent kind.ThetradeandcommerceoftheMediterraneanwerethenlargelycontrolledby oldseafaringpeopleswithwhomtheRomannobles,weddedtoagriculture,could notcompetewithsuccess,orbyex-slavesaccustomedtotrade,whohadnoinfluence inshapingthepoliticsofgovernment.BytheAugustandaytheimportantmenof thestatehadplacedtheirinvestmentsinprovincialrealestateandmortgages,notin industryorcommerce."
The Decline of Enterprise "Before Caesar's death Rome was probably the financial center of the Roman world,"remarksFrank (1933, 350) ."Yetnodominatingbankingfirmgrewup." Andreau(1999,137) 
Conclusion
Pasteventsmakeuspayparticularattentiontothe future,ifwereallymakethoroughenquiryineach caseintothepast.
-Polybius(XII25e,6) Mesopotamia's lack of basic raw materials prompted even military rulers such as SargonofAkkadtoboastthattheyhadextendedlong-distancecommerce.Bycontrast,theMediterraneanaristocraciessoughtlocalself-sufficiency.Thisbecamethe conditionintowhichthewesternRomanEmpiresankaseconomicliferetreatedto landedestates,whileprosperitylastedlongerinEgyptandtheeasternhalfofthe RomanEmpireruledfromConstantinople. The fact that Near Easterners were the first to develop the basic repertory of businesspracticesposesthequestionofwhatisdistinctlyWestern.ClassicalGreece andRomehavelongbeendepictedasrepresentingafreshstart,incontrasttothe allegedlystagnantNearEasterneconomies.YettheNearEastenjoyedsuperiorprosperityfromthebeginningtotheendofantiquity,aswellasbettereconomicbalance andstability.Whathaslongbeenviewedasafreshspiritofindividualismturnsout to be a product of the breakdown following the devastation that swept the easternMediterraneanafter1200BC.Theensuinginterregnumbroughtafree-for-all thatneverdevelopedanethicofsteeringgain-seekingalongproductiveratherthan predatoryandextractivelines.
WhenSyrianandPhoenicianmerchantsorganizedMediterraneantradeinthe eighthcenturyBC,theybroughtstandardizedweightsandmeasures,money,afinancialvocabulary,andinterest-bearingdebttoGreekandItaliancommunities.Local chieftains applied these practices in a smaller, more localized context that lacked thechecksandbalancesfoundintheNearEasttosaveeconomiesfrompolarizing betweencreditorsanddebtors.ApartfromSolon'sseisachtheia,GreeceandRome hadnotraditionofannullingdebtstopreventcreditorsfromforeclosingontheland andreducingmuchofthecitizenrytodebtbondage.Justtheopposite:Greeceand Romemeasuredsuccessbytheabilityofcreditorstoachievesocialstatusthrough landownership with its patronage power over tenants and clients. There was no attempt to justify wealth and property by attributing it to the labor expended by itsowners.Landwasobtainedbyinheritanceorthroughforeclosureontheimpecunious,ortakenfromthepublicdomainbymilitaryconquestorinsiderdealing. Bondage became harsher and more inexorable, with more than a quarter of the RomanpopulationfallingintoservitudebythefourthcenturyAD,increasinglyon largeslave-stockedestates.
Rome'seconomichistoryprovidesaleadingexampleofArnoldToynbee'sconclusioninA Study of History thatthecauseofimperialcollapseinvariablyis"suicidal statecraft." It is the same contrast that Baumol has drawn between productiveandunproductiveenterprise. 
